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Abstract
In environments with expected utility, it has long been established that specula-
tive trade cannot occur (Milgrom and Stokey [1982]), and that the value of public
information is negative in economies with risk-sharing and no aggregate uncertainty
(Hirshleifer [1971], Schlee [2001]). We show that these results are still true even if we
relax expected utility, so that either Dynamic Consistency (DC) or Consequentialism
is violated. We characterise no speculative trade in terms of a weakening of DC and
find that Consequentialism is not required. Moreover, we show that a weakening of
both DC and Consequentialism is sufficient for the value of public information to be
negative. We therefore generalise these important results for convex preferences which
contain several classes of ambiguity averse preferences.
JEL-Classifications: D81, D83, D91
Keywords: Updating, Ambiguity, Dynamic Consistency, Bayesian, Consequen-
tialism, Value of Information, No Trade, Speculative Trade.
1 Introduction
In markets with subjective expected utility (SEU), it has long been established by
Milgrom and Stokey [1982] that speculative trade cannot occur. This means that if
the market is at an ex ante Pareto optimal allocation, differential information among
traders in the interim stage can never imply that it is common knowledge that there
is another allocation which Pareto dominates it. Moreover, in standard neoclassical
economies with complete markets and symmetric information, it is shown with an ex-
ample by Hirshleifer [1971] and more generally by Schlee [2001] that public information
makes everyone weakly worse off, as it destroys opportunities for mutual insurance.
∗Results from this paper were contained in an older version of Galanis [2019]. I am grateful to Alain
Chateauneuf, Miche`le Cohen, Martin Cripps, Adam Dominiak, Paolo Ghirardato, Ju¨rgen Eichberger, Larry
G. Epstein, Tassos Karantounias, Peter Klibanoff, Stelios Kotronis, Jean-Philippe Lefort, Jian Li, Sujoy
Mukerji, Pietro Ortoleva, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon and audiences at CRETE 2014, ASSET 2014, RES
2015, RUD 2015, Cergy-Pontoise, Manchester, Warwick and Royal Holloway. Data sharing is not applicable
to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.
†Department of Economics, City, University of London, spyros.galanis@city.ac.uk.
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By adopting the SEU model, both these results implicitly assume the following two
properties. The first is Dynamic Consistency, which requires that an action plan is
optimal when evaluated with the updated preferences of a later period, if and only if it
is optimal when evaluated with the preferences of an earlier period. DC ensures that
an ex ante optimal action plan will remain optimal at every period and irrespective of
how information is updated. In the SEU model, DC is expressed through the Bayesian
updating of the prior. The second property, Consequentialism, requires that conditional
preferences do not depend on past actions, foregone payoffs or unrealized events.
These two properties are normatively appealing and form the basis of backward in-
duction and dynamic programming. However, several decision theoretic models violate
them. For instance, preferences which are ambiguity sensitive must either relax DC or
Consequentialism (Siniscalchi [2009]), whereas Dominiak et al. [2012] show experimen-
tally that subjects violate DC.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether no speculative trade and the
negative value of public information for mutual insurance are still valid in general
models with convex preferences, where either DC or Consequentialism is violated. We
find that they are. On the one hand, we relax Consequentialism and adopt the weaker
Status Quo Bias, which has been proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and Ok
[2005], Sagi [2006] and Ortoleva [2010], and identified experimentally by Samuelson
and Zeckhauser [1988]. On the other hand, we adopt weak DC as formulated and
motivated in Galanis [2019], in a single-agent environment with convex preferences.
First, we find that Consequentialism can be dropped completely and that the “if”
part of weak DC is the minimum requirement which ensures that there is no speculative
trade. This means that if every trader’s preferences satisfies this axiom, there can be
no speculative trade, whereas if at least one trader violates it, there are examples with
speculative trade. Galanis [2019] showed that the “if” part of weak DC characterises the
Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs, which are identified by Rigotti et al. [2008] in
the context of convex preferences and can be interpreted as the prices for Arrow-Debreu
securities which characterize Pareto efficient allocations. Hence, an intuitive axiom for
single-agent environments has natural implications for a multi-agent environment.
Second, under Status Quo Bias, we find that the “only if” part of DC implies that
the value of public information is negative for mutual insurance, so traders would prefer
not receiving more free information. Moreover, the “only if” part of weak DC implies
that the value of public information is weakly negative, so that the traders would
prefer to mix more with less information, instead of getting less information for sure.
These results mirror the findings of Galanis [2019] for single-agent environments: the
“only if” part of DC characterises an agent who always prefers receiving more to less
information, whereas the “only if” part of weak DC characterises an agent who prefers
to mix more with less information, instead of getting less information for sure. In other
words, if information is (weakly) valuable for each agent, then public information is
(weakly) not valuable for all agents.
1.1 Related literature
Rigotti et al. [2008] (RSS) identify the subjective beliefs generated by a large number
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of models of ambiguity aversion, based on an idea of Yaari [1969], making our approach
very general. These models are the convex Choquet model of Schmeidler [1989], the
multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], the variational preferences
model of Maccheroni et al. [2006], the multiplier model of Hansen and Sargent [2001],
the smooth second-order prior models of Klibanoff et al. [2005] and Nau [2006], the
confidence preferences model of Chateauneuf and Faro [2009] and the second-order
expected utility model of Ergin and Gul [2009].1
Ma [2001] proves that there is no speculative trade using DC and a weakening
of Consequentialism, called piecewise monotonicity, whereas Galanis [2018] examines
speculative trade under unawareness. Halevy [2004] shows that Consequentialism can
be weakened, using Resolute Conditional preferences and Conditional Decomposition,
but retains the full force of DC. In this paper, we prove the same result by weakening
both DC and Consequentialism.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3, we show
that the “if” part of weak DC is the minimum requirement that precludes speculative
trade. In Section 4, we show that if each agent individually considers information to
be (weakly) valuable, then public information is not (weakly) valuable in competitive
risk-sharing environments with no aggregate uncertainty. All proofs are contained in
the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Preliminaries
Fix a finite set of payoff relevant states S, with typical element s. The set of conse-
quences is R+, interpreted as monetary payoffs. Let F = RS+ be the set of acts, with
the natural topology. An act f ∈ F maps each state s to a monetary payoff. Given
x ∈ R+, let x ∈ F be the constant act with payoff x at each state s. Let X be the set
of constant acts. An act f is strictly positive if f(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. Let F+ be the
set of strictly positive acts.
For any two acts f, g ∈ F and event E ⊆ S, we denote by fEg the act h such that
h(s) = f(s) if s ∈ E and h(s) = g(s) if s /∈ E. Define f ≥E g if f(s) ≥ g(s) for all
s ∈ E, with strict inequality for some s ∈ E. Equality f =E g and strict inequality are
similarly defined. Let Ec be the complement of E with respect to S.
Given events E,F ⊆ S and probability measure p ∈ ∆E, where F ⊆ E and
p(F ) > 0, denote by pF ∈ ∆F the measure obtained through Bayesian conditioning of
p on F . Formally, for any event G ⊆ S, pF (G) = p(G∩F )p(F ) . We write Epf :=
∑
s∈E
p(s)f(s)
for the expectation of f given p.
Let E be a collection of nonempty events E ⊆ S which contains S. The decision
maker is endowed with a collection of conditional preference relations, {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F ,
one for each event E ∈ E and each act h ∈ F . The interpretation is that in a previous
period the agent had chosen act h and in the current period he learns that event E
1Note that RSS adopts a domain of preferences over monetary acts, whereas these models allow for more
general domains. Galanis [2019] discusses their differences.
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has occurred. His updated preference relation is then %E,h. The ex ante preference
relation %S,h does not depend on the act h and is denoted by %.
A partition Π of S is a collection of mutually disjoint events, whose union is S. It
is finer than another partition Π′ if, for each E′ ∈ Π′, there exists E ∈ Π with E ⊆ E′.
We then say that Π′ is coarser than Π.
2.2 Revealed preference
Given preference relation %E,h, we say that act f is revealed preferred to act g, written
f %∗E,h g, if f %E,h ag + (1 − a)f for all a ∈ [0, 1], so that f is weakly preferred
to all convex combinations of f and g. Preference relation %∗E,h is transitive but not
necessarily complete.
The interpretation of f %∗E,h g is that f is weakly preferred to g under %E,h and g
is inside a “budget set”, which is constructed given f as the agent’s endowment and
some prices for the Arrow-Debreu securities, one for each state. If these prices were to
prevail and the agent chose f , it would be revealed that the agent prefers f over g.
2.3 Convex preferences
We consider the following axioms on preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F , for all events E ∈ E
and acts h ∈ F .
Axiom 1. (Preference). %E,h is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2. (Continuity). For all f ∈ F , the sets {g ∈ F : g %E,h f} and {g ∈ F :
f %E,h g} are closed.
Axiom 3. (Strong Monotonicity). For all f 6=E g, if f ≥E g, then f E,h g.
Axiom 4. (Convexity). For all f ∈ F , the set {g ∈ F|g %E,h f} is convex.
Axiom 5. (Conditional Preference) For all f, g ∈ F , if f =E g then f ∼E,h g.
These axioms are standard and the first four imply that each %E,h is represented
by a continuous, increasing and quasiconcave function UE,h : F → R. The fifth axiom
specifies that if the agent knows that event E has occurred, his preferences depend only
on what acts prescribe inside E. We say that preferences {%E}E∈E,h∈F are convex if
they satisfy Axioms 1 through 5 and strictly convex if they additionally satisfy Axiom
6.
Axiom 6. (Strict Convexity). For all f 6=E g and α ∈ (0, 1), if f %E,h g, then
αf + (1− α)g E,h g.
2.4 Consequentialism
Consequentialism requires that the agent’s preferences depend only on the received
information and not on the act that was chosen in the previous period.2
2Some papers refer to Consequentialism as the conjunction of Axioms 5 and 7.
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Axiom 7. (Consequentialism) For all f, g ∈ F and events E ∈ E, %E,f=%E,g.
A weakening of Axiom 7 has been proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and
Ok [2005], Sagi [2006] and Ortoleva [2010], where preference relation %E,h depends on
a “status quo” act (or frame) h. It specifies that if the agent ever prefers f over g
(given some status quo h), then he would also prefer it if the status quo was f . In
other words, the status quo exerts attraction towards itself.
Axiom 8. (Status Quo Bias) For all f, g, h ∈ F and events E ∈ E, if f %E,h g then
f %E,f g.
As pointed by Masatlioglu and Ok [2005], Status Quo Bias is documented not only
by experimental studies but also by empirical work in actual markets. For instance,
Madrian and Shea [2001] examined how the default choice influenced participation in
401(k) saving plans, whereas Samuelson and Zeckhauser [1988] identified Status Quo
Bias experimentally, in a study concerning portfolio choices.
2.5 Dynamic Consistency
DC provides restrictions on how two acts, which are identical outside of the conditioning
event E, should be compared before and after E is known to have occurred. We break
DC into two Axioms and adopt the names proposed by Ghirardato [2002].
Axiom 9. (Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f, g ∈ F and events E ∈ E,
if f % g and f =Ec g then f %E,f g.
Axiom 10. (Information is Valuable) For all acts f, g ∈ F and events E ∈ E, if
f %E,f g and f =Ec g then f % g.
Suppose that f and g specify the same payoff at each state not belonging to event
E and that f is weakly preferred to g ex ante. Consistency of Implementation says
that if the agent has chosen f ex ante and he is informed that event E has occurred
(so that his preferences are %E,f ), then in the interim stage f is still weakly preferred
to g. Information is Valuable specifies the converse.
In a single-agent setting, Galanis [2019] provides an extensive discussion of DC and
motivates the following version of weak DC, using the revealed preference relation, %∗.
Axiom 11. (Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F and
events E ∈ E, if f %∗ g and f =Ec g then f %E,f g.
Axiom 12. (Weak Information is Valuable) For all acts f ∈ F , g ∈ F+ and events
E ∈ E, if f %E,f g, f =Ec g and g  f then g 6%∗ f .
Weak Consistency of Implementation requires that if f is revealed preferred (but not
necessarily weakly preferred) to g ex ante, then f is weakly preferred to g, conditional
on E.3 Weak Information is Valuable specifies that if f is weakly preferred to g
conditional on E and f but ex ante strictly preferred to f , then g is not revealed
preferred to f ex ante.
3We also require that f is a strictly positive act.
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2.6 Subjective beliefs
RSS define the subjective beliefs at an act f and preference relation %E,h to be the set
of all normals (normalized to be probabilities) of the supporting hyperplanes of f ,
piE,h(f) = {p ∈ ∆S : Epg ≥ Epf for all g %E,h f}.
RSS provide two alternative definitions for subjective beliefs and show that all three
coincide for strictly positive acts. First, suppose that the agent’s endowment is act f
and we interpret a probability measure as a set of prices, one for each Arrow-Debreu
security which pays 1 in a particular state and 0 otherwise. Given preference relation
%E,h, the subjective beliefs revealed by unwillingness to trade at f contain the measures
(prices) for which the agent would be unwilling to trade his endowment,
piuE,h(f) = {p ∈ ∆S : f %E,h g for all g such that Epg = Epf}.
Second, let P be a set of measures (prices) such that whenever another act k is
unaffordable for every p ∈ P , then there exists a mixture of k with endowment f that
the agent would strictly prefer to his endowment. The smallest such P of measures
contains the subjective beliefs revealed by willingness to trade at f . Formally, let PE,h(f)
denote the collection of all compact, convex sets P ⊆ ∆S such that if Epg > Epf for
all p ∈ P , then g + (1− )f E,h f for sufficiently small  > 0. Then, the subjective
beliefs revealed by willingness to trade at f are denoted by piwE,h(f) =
⋂PE,h(f). RSS
show that for strictly positive acts f , piE,h(f) = pi
u
E,h(f) = pi
w
E,h(f).
3 Speculative trade
In this and the next section, we show that weak DC has economic content in multi-
agent settings, such as financial markets. First, we show that Axiom 11 is the minimum
requirement which precludes speculative trade. In a single-agent setting, Galanis [2019]
shows that Axiom 11 is equivalent to Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
Consider an economy consisting of I agents, with |I| = m and typical element i.
Each agent’s consumption set is the set of acts F . He is endowed with a collection of
convex preferences {%iE,h}E∈E,h∈F .
An economy is a tuple 〈{%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I〉, where e ∈ RS++ is the aggre-
gate endowment and {Πi}i∈I denotes the information structure, where each Πi ⊆ E is
a partition of S. If in period 0 the resulting allocation is f , then in period 1 and at
state s, agent i considers states in Πi(s) to be possible and has conditional preferences
%i
Πi(s),f i
.
An allocation is a tuple f = (f1, . . . , fm) ∈ Fm. It is feasible if ∑mi=1 f i = e.
It is interior if f i(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S and for all i. Given an event E ⊆ S, let
Ki(E) = {s ∈ S : Πi(s) ⊆ E} be the set of states where i knows E. Event E is self
evident if E ⊆ Ki(E) for all i ∈ I. That is, an event is self evident if whenever it
happens, everyone knows it. An event F is common knowledge at s if and only if there
exists a self evident event E such that s ∈ E ⊆ F (Aumann [1976]).
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We say that there is speculative trade if an allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient
(according to preferences {%i}i∈I) but at some state s ∈ S it is common knowledge
that there exists a Pareto improvement.
Definition 1. There is speculative trade in economy 〈{%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I〉 at
an ex ante Pareto efficient allocation f if there is agent j ∈ I, state s′ and feasible
allocation g such that event H = {s ∈ S : gi %i
Πi(s),f i
f i for all i ∈ I and gj j
Πj(s),fj
f j} is common knowledge at s′.
We now show Axiom 11 is necessary and sufficient for preventing speculative trade.
In particular, if all agents satisfy Axiom 11 then there is no speculative trade, whereas if
at least one fails it, there are economies with speculative trade. Let P be the collection
of convex preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F . Note that we do not require Consequentialism
or Status Quo Bias.
Proposition 1. If {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F ∈ PI satisfy Axiom 11 then there is no specula-
tive trade in any economy 〈{%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I〉 and at any interior allocation
f . Conversely, if {%kE,h}E∈E,h∈F ∈ P fails Axiom 11 then there exist preferences {%iE,h
}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F ∈ PI satisfying Axiom 11 and economy 〈{%iE,h}i∈I∪{k},E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I∪{k}〉
such that there is speculative trade at an allocation f .
To provide a sketch of the proof for one direction, suppose by contradiction that
allocation {f i}i∈I is ex ante Pareto efficient but in the interim it is common knowledge
at some state s′ that allocation {gi}i∈I is a Pareto improvement. From Aumann [1976],
there exists a self evident event F containing s′, where s ∈ F implies gi Πi(s),f i f i
for all i ∈ I.4 Axiom 5 implies giΠi(s)f i Πi(s),f i f i. Because each Πi partitions F ,
Axiom 11 implies Ep(giFf i) > Epf i for all p ∈ pii(f i). By convexity of preferences,
giFf i + (1 − )f i i f i for small enough  > 0, which contradicts that {f i}i∈I is ex
ante Pareto efficient.
Following Kajii and Ui [2009], Martins-da-Rocha [2010] also shows that Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs precludes speculative trade. But both papers assume
Consequentialism, which is not needed here. Halevy [2004] proves the absence of spec-
ulative trade by assuming DC but relaxing Consequentialism to the following two
properties: Resolute Conditional preferences (which is similar to our Axiom 5) and
Conditional Decomposability (which we do not require). Ma [2001] proves the result
using DC and a weakening of Consequentialism, called piecewise monotonicity. Galanis
[2018] examines speculative trade in an environment with unawareness, where DC is
violated but Consequentialism is not.
4 The value of public information
In a single-agent setting, Galanis [2019] shows that information is (weakly) valuable
if and only if Axiom 10 (Axiom 12) is satisfied. In this section, we explore whether
public information is valued in multi-agent settings where each agent values information
4We can assume strict preference for everyone due to Strong Monotonicity.
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individually. In the standard environment with expected utility, where each agent
values information, Hirshleifer [1971] first argued with an example that if agents trade
in order to mutually insure, then more public information could make everyone worse
off. Schlee [2001] generalised this result, showing that the value of public information
is negative in an expected utility model with a common prior, risk aversion and no
aggregate uncertainty.5
For general convex preferences, we find that as long as Bayesian updating of sub-
jective beliefs (Axiom 11) and Status Quo Bias are satisfied, if every agent (weakly)
values information, then public information is (weakly) not valuable.6
In order to rule out pure indifference to betting, we assume strictly convex prefer-
ences. We also assume the following axiom, which is proposed by RSS.
Axiom 13. (Translation Invariance at Certainty). For all acts h ∈ F and events
E ∈ E, for all g ∈ F and all constant bundles x, x′ > 0, if x + λg %E,h x for some
λ > 0, then there exists λ′ > 0 such that x′ + λ′g %E,h x′.
RSS show that Axiom 13 is satisfied by most classes of ambiguity averse preferences
and it implies that subjective beliefs do not change across constant acts: piiE,h(x) =
piiE,h(x
′) for all constant acts x, x′ > 0. We henceforth write piiE,h instead of pi
i
E,h(x) for
all constant acts x > 0.
We also impose a slight variation of Axiom 11. First, it applies only to constant
acts. Second, it should apply not only between the ex ante preference relation %∗ and
the interim %E,x, but also between %∗F,h and %E,x, where E ⊆ F and F ∈ E . In other
words, it is as if we consider a multi period model where the agent first learns F and
then E.
Axiom 14. (Multi Period Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts x, g, h ∈
F , where x > 0 is constant, and events F,E ∈ E with E ⊆ F , if x %∗F,h g and x =Ec g
then x %E,x g.
There are two periods, 0 and 1. In period 0, the agents’ common information
structure about period 1 is represented by partition Π of S. Hence, there is symmetric
information among all agents. The initial allocation is {ei}i∈I , where ei ∈ F+.The
aggregate endowment is
∑
i∈I
ei = e ∈ RS++. We assume that there is no aggregate
uncertainty, so e is constant across all states in S. The economy in period 0 is a tuple
〈S,%1, . . . ,%m, e〉.
In period 1, all agents are informed that some event E ∈ Π has occurred and trade,
using their conditional preferences. Hence, information is symmetric. Trading at each
E ∈ Π generates an act for each agent, which is evaluated in period 0 using preference
relation %i.
5Schlee [2001] uses the Blackwell [1951] criterion of more information. Moreover, he proves this result in
two other cases, that we do not examine. First, there are some risk neutral agents who fully insure the risk
averse ones. Second, all agents are risk averse and the economy has a representative agent.
6Similar results are shown by Galanis [2015, 2016], in an environment with unawareness, where DC is
violated but Consequentialism is not.
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Given event E ∈ Π, an allocation for economy 〈E,%1
E,hi
, . . . ,%mE,hm , e〉 is a tuple
fE = (f
1
E , . . . , f
m
E ) ∈ Fm.7 It is feasible if
∑m
i=1 f
i
E = e. It is interior if f
i
E(s) > 0 for
all s ∈ E and for all i. A feasible allocation fE is full insurance if each f iE is constant
across all states in E. It is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible allocation gE such
that giE %iE,hi f iE for all i ∈ I and gjE jE,hj f
j
E for some j ∈ I.
Fix a collection of convex preferences {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F . Let M = {Π, e} be an
aggregate decision problem, where Π ⊆ E is a partition of S and e ∈ RS++ is the
aggregate endowment, assumed constant across states.
Given event E ∈ Π and economy 〈E,%1
E,hi
, . . . ,%mE,hm , e〉, define fE = {f iE}i∈I ∈
Fm to be an equilibrium allocation if it is feasible and there are prices p ∈ RS+, with
p(s) = 0 if s /∈ E, such that, for each i ∈ I, Epf iE ≤ Epei and f iE %iE,hi g for all g such
that Epg ≤ Epei.
We say that interior allocation {f i}i∈I is admissible for aggregate decision problem
M = {Π, e} if, for each agent i ∈ I, for each E ∈ Π, f i =E f iE , where fE = {f iE}i∈I
is an equilibrium allocation of economy 〈E,%1E,f1 , . . . ,%mE,fm , e〉. In words, {f i}i∈I is
admissible if, under some equilibrium, agent i receives f iE at each E ∈ Π.
We compare aggregate decision problems by evaluating the admissible acts they
generate.
Definition 2. Aggregate decision problem M1 = {Π1, e} is not more valuable than
M2 = {Π2, e} if whenever {gi}i∈I is admissible for M2, there exists {f i}i∈I which
is admissible for M1 and gi %i f i, for all i ∈ I. It is weakly not more valuable if
agi + (1− a)f i % f i for some a ∈ (0, 1].
We say that public information is (weakly) not valuable if an aggregate decision
problem with a finer partition is always (weakly) not more valuable than a decision
problem with a coarser partition.
Definition 3. Public information is (weakly) not valuable for {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F if,
for all endowments e and partitions Π1,Π2 of S, Π1 finer than Π2, aggregate decision
problem M1 = {Π1, e} is (weakly) not more valuable than M2 = {Π2, e}.
The following Proposition shows that if information is (weakly) valuable for each
agent, then public information is (weakly) not valuable.
Proposition 2. Suppose strictly convex preferences {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F satisfy Axioms
8, 13 and 14. Then, Axiom 12 implies that public information is weakly not valuable,
whereas Axiom 10 implies that it is not valuable.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix j ∈ I. From Axioms 2 and 3 we have that H = G ≡
{s ∈ S : gi0 iΠi(s),f i f i for all i ∈ I} for some feasible allocation g0, as we can always
7Note that we define the aggregate endowment of the economy as a map from S (rather than E) to R++.
This is without loss of generality because, from Axiom 5, what the endowment prescribes outside of E is
irrelevant. For consistency, we do the same for all subsequent acts.
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distribute a small enough portion of j’s allocation to everyone else. We subsequently
show that G cannot be common knowledge at any s, denoting g0 by g.
Because f is an ex ante efficient allocation, there does not exist a feasible allocation
h such that hi i f i for all i ∈ I. Suppose that there exists feasible allocation g
such that G is common knowledge at s ∈ S. Let F be a self evident event such that
s ∈ F ⊆ G. Note that each Πi partitions F . Then, we have that for each i ∈ I, for
each s′ ∈ F , gi i
Πi(s′),f i f
i. From Axiom 5, giΠi(s′)f i i
Πi(s′),f i f
i. Using Axiom 11
we have that f i 6%∗i giΠi(s′)f i. Noting that f i is strictly positive, so that piui = pii,
and from the definition of piui, we have that Ep(giΠi(s′)f i) > Epf i for all p ∈ pii(f i).
Because this is true for all s′ ∈ S such that Πi(s′) ⊆ F and Πi partitions F , we have
that Ep(giFf i) > Epf i, for all p ∈ pii(f i). Define hi = giFf i and h = {hi}i∈I .
Allocation f is interior, hence piui(f i) = piwi(f i) = pii(f i). Because Ephi > Epf i
for all p ∈ piwi(f i), we have that for small enough i, ihi + (1 − i)f i i f i. By
taking  < i for all i ∈ I, we have that hi + (1 − )f i i f i for all i ∈ I. Moreover,
h + (1 − )f is feasible because both f and h are feasible. Hence, f is not ex ante
efficient, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that {%1E,h}E∈E,h∈F fails Axiom 11. This means that for some
event E ∈ E and acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F , with f =Ec g, we have g 1E,f f and Ep0g ≤ Ep0f
for some p0 ∈ pi1u(f). Consider an economy with two agents, 1 and 2. Their information
structure is identical, so that Π1 = Π2 = Π = {E,Ec}. Let e = f + g. Agent 2
has preferences represented by expected utility. In particular, h ∼2 h′ if and only if
Ep0h = Ep0h′. His conditional preferences given E or Ec are given by updating p0
using Bayes’ rule. This is well defined because Axiom 3 implies Axiom 8 in Galanis
[2019], hence from Lemma 2 in that paper we have that p(E), p(Ec) > 0.
We next show that allocation h = {f, g} is ex ante Pareto efficient. Suppose
there exists allocation {x, y} such that x 1 f and y %2 g. Because p0 ∈ pi1u(f),
we have that Ep0x > Ep0f . Moreover, Ep0y ≥ Ep0g. These inequalities imply that
Ep0(x + y) > Ep0(f + g) = Ep0e, which implies that x + y 6= e, hence {x, y} is not
feasible. A similar argument applies if x %1 f and y 2 g.
Note that f %2 g because Ep0g ≤ Ep0f . Given E and since f =Ec g, we have that
Ep0Eg ≤ Ep0Ef , which implies f %2E,g g. Because g 1E f , at each s ∈ E it is common
knowledge that allocation h′ = {g, f} Pareto dominates h = {f, g}, hence there is
speculative trade.
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that because Axiom 6 implies Axiom 7 (No Flat
Kinks) in Galanis [2019], Proposition 1 in that paper implies that if information is
(weakly) valuable then {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F satisfy Axiom 10 (Axiom 12), for each i ∈ I.
Let e be the endowment and suppose partition Π1 is finer than partition Π2. Let
{gi}i∈I be admissible for M2 = {Π2, e}, defined as follows. Let {gE2}E2∈Π2 be a tuple
where, for each E2 ∈ Π2, gE2 is an equilibrium allocation for economy 〈E2,%1E2,g1
, . . . ,%mE2,gm , e〉 with (normalized) prices pE2 ∈ ∆S, such that p(s) = 0 if s /∈ E2. For
each E2 ∈ Π2, let gi =E2 giE2 . From the first welfare theorem, gE2 is Pareto optimal.
From Proposition 9 in RSS, gE2 is a full insurance allocation. From Axiom 3, p
E2 > 0
for all s ∈ E2 and giE2(s) = EpE2ei, for all s ∈ E2 and all i ∈ I. Hence, gE2 is also an
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interior allocation. Proposition 9 in RSS implies that pE2 ∈ ⋂i piiE2,gi .
Proposition 1 in RSS shows that piE,gi(f) = pi
ui
E,gi
(f) for all strictly positive acts.
Moreover, Axiom 3 implies Axiom 8 (Weak Full Support) in Galanis [2019], hence
Lemma 2 in that paper implies pE2(E1) > 0. It is straightforward that we can use the
proof of Proposition 2 in Galanis [2019], but applying Axiom 14 instead of Axiom 11,
to show that there is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs at a constant act, between
any events F,E ∈ E , where E ⊆ F . We therefore have pE2E1 ∈
⋂
i pi
i
E1
, for each E1 ⊆ E2,
where E1 ∈ Π1 and pE2E1 is the Bayesian update of pE2 on E1.
Define allocation {f i}i∈I as follows. If E1 ⊆ E2, where E1 ∈ Π1 and E2 ∈ Π2, then
f i =E1 f
i
E1
, where fE1 = (f
1
E1
, . . . , fmE1) is such that, for each i ∈ I, f iE1(s) = EpE2E1e
i
for all s ∈ E1. Hence, each fE1 is a full insurance allocation. Because pE2E1 ∈ piiE1 , f iE1
is weakly preferred to each act h that is affordable given prices pE2E1 . Because fE1 is
feasible, it is an equilibrium allocation of economy (E1,%1E1,f1 , . . . ,%
m
E1,fm
, e).
By construction, EpE2f i = EpE2giE2 . Because p
E2 ∈ ⋂i piiE2 , we have that giE2 %iE2,gi
f i, for all i ∈ I and all E2 ∈ Π2. Axiom 5 implies that gi %iE2,gi f i for each E2 ∈ Π2
and each i ∈ I.
Enumerate the partition cells of Π2 = {E1, . . . , En}. If n = 1 then Π2 = {S} is
the uninformative partition and gi %i f i for each i ∈ I, so we are done. Suppose that
n ≥ 2. For cell 1 ≤ k ≤ n define act hik as follows. Let hik(s) = gi(s) if s ∈ Ej , where
1 ≤ j ≤ k, and hik(s) = f i(s) otherwise. Note that hin = gi and let hi0 = f i. For each
1 ≤ k ≤ n, from Axiom 5, we have that gi %i
Ek,gi
f i implies hik %iEk,gi h
i
k−1. Axiom
8 implies hik %iEk,hik h
i
k−1. Applying Axiom 10 we have h
i
k %i hik−1. By Axiom 1, we
have that gi %i f i, for each i ∈ I, which implies that M1 is not more valuable than
M2. Therefore, public information is not valuable.
For the second claim, for each E2 ∈ Π2 define hiE2 = giE2E2f i. From Axiom 5,
giE2 %
i
E2,gi
f i implies hiE2 %
i
E2,gi
f i. Axiom 8 implies hiE2 %
i
E2,hiE2
f i. From Axiom 12,
either hiE2 %
i f i or f i i hiE2 and f i 6%∗i hiE2 . If hiE2 %i f i, Axiom 6 implies that for
all a ∈ (0, 1), ahiE2 + (1− a)f i i f i. This means that Ep(ahiE2 + (1− a)f i) > Epf i for
all p ∈ pii(f i), or that EphiE2 > Epf i. Hence, in both cases we have that EphiE2 > Epf i
for all p ∈ pii(f i). Repeating this argument for all E2 ∈ Π2, we have that Epgi > Epf i
for all p ∈ pii(f i). By definition, for small enough i > 0, igi + (1 − i)f i i f i. By
taking  < i for all i ∈ I, we have that gi + (1− )f i i f i for all i ∈ I, hence public
information is weakly not valuable.
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